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Talk:Restless Souls/Summary: Difference between revisions
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* ''Russians, useful idiots to China. Europeans, useful idiots to USA.'' […] A more probable scenario - Cold War 1.5 (2022-2050) - is that Russia endures most financial and economic sanctions with help of China. Russia will get computer chips and other high-tech products from China. Russia will remain in a mediocre bad condition with a trend for even worse because it slides more and more into Chinese dependencies. Alone the different growth rates will make them complete uneven partners. Russia has little to await from the West and eventually China - superpower number one. - Then when enough time past fully disillusioned post-Putin Russians can hope for normalization with Europe. [[Restless_Souls/Technology#Terra_Preta_2.0|Terra Preta 2.0.]] | * ''Russians, useful idiots to China. Europeans, useful idiots to USA.'' […] A more probable scenario - Cold War 1.5 (2022-2050) - is that Russia endures most financial and economic sanctions with help of China. Russia will get computer chips and other high-tech products from China. Russia will remain in a mediocre bad condition with a trend for even worse because it slides more and more into Chinese dependencies. Alone the different growth rates will make them complete uneven partners. Russia has little to await from the West and eventually China - superpower number one. - Then when enough time past fully disillusioned post-Putin Russians can hope for normalization with Europe. [[Restless_Souls/Technology#Terra_Preta_2.0|Terra Preta 2.0.]] | ||
:: The decision to include SWIFT in the sanctions package is a tough one, a dilemma in the face of damage dealt to everyone. It should be done anyway since the other sanctions are not strong enough and SWIFT was already announced. NATO make themselves incredible if they make a retraction. Especially Germany SHOULD NOT block this decision after its steal helmets "joke". (In general the denial of weapon deliveries was justifiable to avoid a blame game in context of escalations. This has changed after invasion by Russia.) | :: The decision to include SWIFT in the sanctions package is a tough one, a dilemma in the face of damage dealt to everyone. It should be done anyway since the other sanctions are not strong enough and SWIFT was already announced. NATO make themselves incredible if they make a retraction. Especially Germany SHOULD NOT block this decision after its steal helmets "joke". (In general the denial of weapon deliveries was justifiable to avoid a blame game in context of escalations. This has changed after invasion by Russia.) | ||
::: In that case we need to '''prepare against unprecedented retaliations''' from Russia: massive waves the disinformation, '''cyberattacks''' and and perhaps total blockage of fossile energie. | |||
:::: Would Russia really cut us off from gas and coal if it is an important source of money for them. If they are cut off from SWIFT it's hard to pay them anyway - and if we do further political questions would surface.) | :::: Would Russia really cut us off from gas and coal if it is an important source of money for them. If they are cut off from SWIFT it's hard to pay them anyway - and if we do further political questions would surface.) | ||
:: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. (In East Germany it is common knowledge that sanctions hit the civil population harder than the sanctionated government.) The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | |||
:: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | |||
====China==== | ====China==== | ||