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Talk:Restless Souls/Summary: Difference between revisions
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Scenarios: | Scenarios: | ||
* Based on pure logic a full-fledged war across the entire Ukraine is improbable. (Also, Bundeswehr sees not much of a risk. The Ukraine | * Based on pure logic a full-fledged war across the entire Ukraine is improbable. (Also, Bundeswehr sees not much of a risk. The Ukraine doesn't want the escalation to be made real by US talk. And Snowden raised [https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1493641714363478016?cxt=HHwWgMC55bfOvbopAAAA questions], too.) Usually, an attack is carried out as fast as possible so the enemy has no time to prepare his defense. Then again, even if Russia invades they cannot keep such a vast area under control. | ||
:: The communication by western administrations (and media) - especially of USA - has been criticized as warmongering. Apparently, the current strategy is to speak about war as much as possible (to unite own allies behind the banner of NATO) and make Russia not want to prove the West right. | :: The communication by western administrations (and media) - especially of USA - has been criticized as warmongering. Apparently, the current strategy is to speak about war as much as possible (to unite own allies behind the banner of NATO) and make Russia not want to prove the West right. | ||
* A simple end of maneuver sounds almost too good to be real - although it would be still a victory for Putin in having seriously pranked NATO and let them feel how it is to have enemy troops at the boarder (as an official version for mirroring their own security concerns). Though they might delay the final date to push NATO into making concessions. | * A simple end of maneuver sounds almost too good to be real - although it would be still a victory for Putin in having seriously pranked NATO and let them feel how it is to have enemy troops at the boarder (as an official version for mirroring their own security concerns). Though they might delay the final date to push NATO into making concessions. | ||
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: ''Russians, useful idiots to China.'' | : ''Russians, useful idiots to China.'' | ||
: ''Europeans, useful idiots to USA.'' | : ''Europeans, useful idiots to USA.'' | ||
: A more probable scenario - Cold War 1.5 (2022-2050) - is that Russia endures most financial and economic sanctions with help of China. Russia will get computer chips and other high-tech products from China. Russia will remain in a mediocre bad condition with a trend for even worse because it slides more and more into Chinese dependencies. Alone the different growth rates will make them complete uneven partners. Russia has little to await from the West and eventually China - superpower number one. - Then when enough time past fully disillusioned post-Putin Russians can hope for normalization with Europe. [[ | : A more probable scenario - Cold War 1.5 (2022-2050) - is that Russia endures most financial and economic sanctions with help of China. Russia will get computer chips and other high-tech products from China. Russia will remain in a mediocre bad condition with a trend for even worse because it slides more and more into Chinese dependencies. Alone the different growth rates will make them complete uneven partners. Russia has little to await from the West and eventually China - superpower number one. - Then when enough time past fully disillusioned post-Putin Russians can hope for normalization with Europe. [[Restless_Souls/Technology#Terra_Preta_2.0|Terra Preta 2.0.]] | ||
:: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | :: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | ||