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2022. Russia assured multiple times that it will not attack Ukraine. If Russia attacks the Ukraine nonetheless - in whatever form, no matter whether a false flag action happens before or not - they will lose all credibility for a long time and NATO will be forced to impose sanctions. Germany will be forced to stop NS2 and give up its pacifistic basic attitude. If the attack is big enough it would even trigger a new cold war. | 2022. Russia assured multiple times that it will not attack Ukraine. If Russia attacks the Ukraine nonetheless - in whatever form, no matter whether a false flag action happens before or not - they will lose all credibility for a long time and NATO will be forced to impose sanctions. Germany will be forced to stop NS2 and give up its pacifistic basic attitude. If the attack is big enough it would even trigger a new cold war. | ||
Invasion scenarios: | |||
* Based on pure logic a full-fledged war across the entire Ukraine is improbable. (Also, Bundeswehr sees not much of a risk. The Ukraine doesn't want the escalation to be made real by US talk. And Snowden raised [https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1493641714363478016?cxt=HHwWgMC55bfOvbopAAAA questions], too.) Usually, an attack is carried out as fast as possible so the enemy has no time to prepare his defense. Then again, even if Russia invades they cannot keep such a vast area under control. | * Based on pure logic a full-fledged war across the entire Ukraine is improbable. (Also, Bundeswehr sees not much of a risk. The Ukraine doesn't want the escalation to be made real by US talk. And Snowden raised [https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1493641714363478016?cxt=HHwWgMC55bfOvbopAAAA questions], too.) Usually, an attack is carried out as fast as possible so the enemy has no time to prepare his defense. Then again, even if Russia invades they cannot keep such a vast area under control. | ||
:: The communication by western administrations (and media) - especially of USA - has been criticized as warmongering. Apparently, the current strategy is to speak about war as much as possible (to unite own allies behind the banner of NATO) and make Russia not want to prove the West right. | :: The communication by western administrations (and media) - especially of USA - has been criticized as warmongering. Apparently, the current strategy is to speak about war as much as possible (to unite own allies behind the banner of NATO) and make Russia not want to prove the West right. | ||
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* '''If Russia is not given any "security" guarantees''' (geopolitical ''cake slice'') they might acknowledge separatists areas (Luhansk and Donetsk) as independent - and annex them in a more far future. (A victory distributed in smaller steps.) The military maneuver right now is like holding a gun to the head of Ukraine to ensure step one. "Do you want to say no? What are you gonna do. Come on, it could be far worse." '''It could be a game about building up a massive wall of threats and very [https://www.nzz.ch/international/ukraine-und-russland-neues-szenario-fuer-den-donbass-ld.1666400?reduced=true high demands] and then let the enemy (NATO) agree to seemingly small points.''' It would be a [https://web.archive.org/web/20180222154736/https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/ostukraine-konflikt-russland-separatisten-paesse-anerkennung-waffenruhe continuation] of a dynamic that started [https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/separatistengebiete-in-ukraine-putin-deutet-anerkennung-an-a-1029376.html long ago]. -- Putin's calculation could be that mediocre sanctions come and go but soil is kept "forever". | * '''If Russia is not given any "security" guarantees''' (geopolitical ''cake slice'') they might acknowledge separatists areas (Luhansk and Donetsk) as independent - and annex them in a more far future. (A victory distributed in smaller steps.) The military maneuver right now is like holding a gun to the head of Ukraine to ensure step one. "Do you want to say no? What are you gonna do. Come on, it could be far worse." '''It could be a game about building up a massive wall of threats and very [https://www.nzz.ch/international/ukraine-und-russland-neues-szenario-fuer-den-donbass-ld.1666400?reduced=true high demands] and then let the enemy (NATO) agree to seemingly small points.''' It would be a [https://web.archive.org/web/20180222154736/https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/ostukraine-konflikt-russland-separatisten-paesse-anerkennung-waffenruhe continuation] of a dynamic that started [https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/separatistengebiete-in-ukraine-putin-deutet-anerkennung-an-a-1029376.html long ago]. -- Putin's calculation could be that mediocre sanctions come and go but soil is kept "forever". | ||
** A spiced up version of scenario 3 is that Russia more or less waits for the conflict between separatists and Ukrainian military to heat up. Western partners tell Ukraine not get provoked. Russia spoke bluntly of military technical responses if no concessions are made. Heavy counter attacks would give Russia the '''pretext to "secure" the conflict zone'''. This Scenario is the most probable as it goes hand in hand with the Russian domestic propaganda. -- Some people speculate that Putin overplayed his hand (geopolitical demands) so that he needs something else as a "victory" and exit. In reality it would be a pyrrhic victory but that is something more domestic propaganda would cover. | ** A spiced up version of scenario 3 is that Russia more or less waits for the conflict between separatists and Ukrainian military to heat up. Western partners tell Ukraine not get provoked. Russia spoke bluntly of military technical responses if no concessions are made. Heavy counter attacks would give Russia the '''pretext to "secure" the conflict zone'''. This Scenario is the most probable as it goes hand in hand with the Russian domestic propaganda. -- Some people speculate that Putin overplayed his hand (geopolitical demands) so that he needs something else as a "victory" and exit. In reality it would be a pyrrhic victory but that is something more domestic propaganda would cover. | ||
*** […] | |||
Many people describe Russia as a kleptocracy where Putin, his fellows and the oligarchs are utterly corrupt and feed on the ordinary citizen. '''The problem with really persisting, devastating Western sanctions is that they won't break Russia's system but push it into more corruption, nationalism, militarism, totalitarianism.''' In worst case it is possible that Russia takes the world hostage for economic support: not by dominance but by simply being dangerous. North Korea XXL on nuclear steroids. | Post-invasion scenarios: | ||
* Many people describe Russia as a kleptocracy where Putin, his fellows and the oligarchs are utterly corrupt and feed on the ordinary citizen. '''The problem with really persisting, devastating Western sanctions is that they won't break Russia's system but push it into more corruption, nationalism, militarism, totalitarianism.''' In worst case it is possible that Russia takes the world hostage for economic support: not by dominance but by simply being dangerous. North Korea XXL on nuclear steroids. | |||
* ''Russians, useful idiots to China. Europeans, useful idiots to USA.'' […] A more probable scenario - Cold War 1.5 (2022-2050) - is that Russia endures most financial and economic sanctions with help of China. Russia will get computer chips and other high-tech products from China. Russia will remain in a mediocre bad condition with a trend for even worse because it slides more and more into Chinese dependencies. Alone the different growth rates will make them complete uneven partners. Russia has little to await from the West and eventually China - superpower number one. - Then when enough time past fully disillusioned post-Putin Russians can hope for normalization with Europe. [[Restless_Souls/Technology#Terra_Preta_2.0|Terra Preta 2.0.]] | |||
:: The decision to include SWIFT in the sanctions package is a tough one, a dilemma in the face of damage dealt to everyone. It should be done anyway since the other sanction are not strong enough and SWIFT was announced. NATO makes themselves incredible if they make a retraction. | |||
:: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | :: A far-future normalization probably will have an interface in structural weak East Germany at first. The more sanctions there are the more Russia will be hit but also specifically East Germany. Pro-Russian (AfD, Linke) and tendential pro-Russian (SPD, CDU) political parties in that region will probably support a normalization in hope for economic improvements. The far right AfD will serve as a catalyst - as a mutual opponent to the democratic parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, Grüne, FDP, Linke). As those do not want AfD to grow they might try to occupy (serve) the topic for themselves - or back it in coalitions at least. West German parties will remember the idiom that "votings are not won but lost in East Germany". They will not want to repeat past mistakes. So in total an absolute majority of German parties will probably support a cautious normalization given that the 2050/2060-future Russian government is honestly interested in such. | ||